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In this paper, we consider a complete continuous-time ﬁnancial market with discontinuous
prices and different types of side-information (initial or progressive strong information, weak
information). The agents strive to maximize the expectation of the logarithm of their terminal
wealth. Our purpose is to explicit and to simulate the optimal strategy of the insiders in some
examples of side-information. We compare those optimal strategies, depending on the type of
side-information.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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This paper deals with the simulation of the optimal strategy of agents who have
some side-information about the market structure, and to compare it to non-
insider’s optimal strategy. Thus, we ﬁx a ﬁnite horizon time T40 and a ﬁltered
probability space ðO;FT ;PÞ, with a multidimensional Brownian motion W and a
multidimensional Poisson process N. A market model is built, with one bond and dsee front matter r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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C. Hillairet / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 115 (2005) 1603–16271604discontinuous risky assets. The agents strive to maximize their expected discounted
utility of terminal wealth on ½0; A, AoT .
Previous works about optimal strategies, such as Karatzas et al. [21], are written in
the classical setting of ﬁnancial markets where the agents share the same information
ﬂow, which is conveyed by the prices. But it seems clear that ﬁnancial markets
inherently have asymmetry of information. In this article, we consider three types of
extra information of an insider.
The ﬁrst type is called ‘‘initial strong’’ information: from the beginning the insider
has an extra information available about the outcome of some variable L of the
prices. The cornerstone of this modelization is the theory of initial enlargement of
ﬁltration by a random variable, which was developed by Jeulin [19], in the series of
papers in the ‘‘Se´minaire de Calcul Stochastique (1982/83)’’ of the University Paris
VI, by Jacod [17], Jeulin and Yor [20], Fo¨llmer and Imkeller [10] and further by
Amendinger et al. [3] and Amendinger [1]. Karatzas and Pikovsky [22] studied
optimization strategies with some examples of real or vectorial random variables:
L ¼ W 1ðTÞ, L ¼ ðliW iðTÞ þ ð1 liÞiÞi¼1;...;d with a family of independent Gaussian
variables . Amendinger et al. [2] quantiﬁed the value of this noisy signal about the
terminal value of the Brownian motion driving the asset prices. In several papers,
including Grorud and Pontier [12] or Grorud [11], the expression of the
compensator, or information drift, is given in examples where the insider knows,
respectively, the ratio at time T of two assets prices or knows that one asset price at
time T will be greater (or smaller) than a given constant. All these examples were
given in a purely diffusive market model. In a mixed diffusive-jump market model,
Elliott and Jeanblanc [9] and Grorud [11] studied the case where L is the number of
jumps over the interval ½0; T .
The second type is called ‘‘progressive strong’’ information: the insider’s
information is perturbed by an independent noise changing throughout time. This
case deals with the theory of a progressive enlargement of ﬁltration. In the
pioneering papers on the enlargement of ﬁltrations (see [20]), the progressive
enlarged ﬁltration is by deﬁnition the smallest one that makes a given random time a
stopping time. Imkeller studied this theory in the context of insider models in [15].
The progressive enlargement of ﬁltration I consider in this paper is in the sense of
Corcuera et al. [8]. Using Malliavin’s calculus, they obtained in [8] the formula of the
compensator in some examples of information, such as a function of the terminal
value of the Brownian motion, disturbed by an independent noise.
The third type is called ‘‘weak’’ information or anticipation: the insider anticipates
the law of a random variable L that will be realized at a future date. The main
difference with a strong information is that there is no change of ﬁltration but only a
change of a probability measure. This notion of weak information is deﬁned by
Baudoin [5,6].
In this paper, we consider the agent’s problem of maximizing the expectation of
the logarithm of his terminal wealth. In some examples of side-information, we
compute the explicit formula of the insiders’ strategy (optimal wealth and portfolio)
in our mixed diffusive-jump market model. We simulate them and compare them
between each other and to the non-insider’s optimal strategy.
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In Section 2, we deﬁne the market and introduce the general framework and
notations that are valid throughout the paper. In Section 3, we recall some technical
results about these three types of side-information: we recall brieﬂy the construction
of a risk neutral probability measure for a strong-informed agent, and a ‘‘minimal
probability measure’’ associated with L for a weak-informed agent. These
probability measures summarize the side-information of each insider. Then we give
the solution of their optimization problem. In Section 4, we explicit the insiders’
strategies in some examples of side-information. First, we explain how to compute
the density process of an initial strong insider’s risk neutral probability measure with
respect to the effective probability measure P. Then, we compute the strategy
(optimal wealth and portfolio) for two examples of initial strong information that
can occur in a case of a merger between two companies: the insider knows that an
asset price will be or not at time T in a given margin, or he knows the ratio at time T
of two assets prices. We explicit the difference of strategy between a non-insider and
an insider in both cases: a purely diffusive market model or a mixed diffusive-jump
market model. In Section 5, we simulate the above strategies in a diffusive-jump
market model with four risky assets and we explicit qualitatively the optimal
investments. Finally, we compare the optimal wealth in the three types of side-
information, each information being a variant of the value at time T of the ﬁrst
component of the Brownian motion. We show that for the same noise dynamics, the
wealths are plausibly ordered in the sense of increasing relevance of side-
information. Figures are given in Appendix A.2. The market
Let W be a real m-dimensional Brownian motion on its canonical probability
space ðOW ;FWT :¼ðFWt Þt2½0;T ;PW Þ. Let N be a n-dimensional Poisson process on its
canonical probability space ðON ;FNT :¼ðFNt Þt2½0;T ;PN Þ, with a positive, FNT -predict-
able intensity k satisfying EPN ½
R T
0 kðtÞdtoþ1. The process M deﬁned by
MðtÞ:¼NðtÞ  R t0 kðsÞds is a ðFNT ;PN Þ-martingale, called the compensated martingale
of the Poisson process N. Let ðO;FT ;PÞ:¼ðOW 
 ON ;FWT  FNT ;PW  PNÞ be the
product space. W and N are independent. LetA be a s-algebra of O. Let d ¼ m þ n.
The agents on the ﬁnancial market are able to invest in d þ 1 assets, the prices of
which are driven by the following stochastic differential equations:
P0ðtÞ ¼ exp
Z t
0
rðsÞds
 
, (2.1)
dPiðtÞ ¼ PiðtÞ biðtÞdt þ
Xd
j¼1
sijðtÞdðW ; NÞj ðtÞ
" #
; i ¼ 1; . . . ; d. (2.2)
X  denotes the transposed process of process X. s is a given strongly non-degenerate
deterministic d 
 d-matrix-valued process. The processes r and b are assumed
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and 1pipd. Thus FT and the ﬁltration generated by the prices are identical.
If the agent has a strong information (initial or progressive), he receives an
individual ﬂow of side-information, represented by the ﬁltration HT :¼ðHtÞt2½0;T .
Thus, we introduce the individual agent’s ﬁltration GT :¼ðGtÞt2½0;T  of available
information, with
Gt:¼Ft _Ht; 0ptpT .
In other words, this agent possesses all information about the market up to the
present time t, plus his own side-information that he does not reveal to the other
agents (except indirectly, by his market strategies). Besides, if the agent has a weak
information, he only has the ﬁltration GT :¼FT of the market available.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A GT -admissible strategy is a portfolio p such that for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; d,
pi
Pi
is GT -predictable and satisﬁes the integrability requirement
R T
0 ksðtÞpðtÞk2 dt
o1 P almost surely and so that the corresponding wealth process X is bounded
from below and satisﬁes X ðTÞX0 P almost surely.
piðtÞ represents the amount invested by the agent at time t in the ith stock
(i ¼ 1; . . . ; d). The agent has an initial wealth X ð0Þ 2 L1ðG0Þ. As usually, we assume
that the strategy is self-ﬁnancing, so the agent’s discounted wealth is given by
bðtÞX ðtÞ ¼ X ð0Þ þ
Z t
0
bðsÞpðsÞðb  rIdÞðsÞds þ
Z t
0
bðsÞpðsÞsðsÞdðW ; NÞðsÞ.
(2.3)
bðtÞ:¼ðP0ðtÞÞ1 is the deﬂator process and Id ¼ ð1; . . . ; 1Þ 2 Rd . But on an enlarged
ﬁltration (GT ;P), the process ðW ; NÞ could no more be a semi-martingale. We will
add in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 sufﬁcient conditions to obtain a meaningful wealth
equation for a strong insider. The agent chooses his strategy so as to optimize his
terminal wealth.
Let us introduce some notations In ¼ ð1; . . . ; 1Þ 2 Rn.
 If v1 et v2 are two vectors of same dimension d, we note v1:v2 the vector with
components ðv1:v2Þi ¼ v1;i:v2;i, i ¼ 1; . . . ; d. E denote the Dole´ans exponential.
We deﬁne YðtÞ:¼m ﬁrst lines of ðsðtÞÞ1ðbðtÞ  rðtÞIdÞ and the n-dimensional process
q such that qðtÞ:kðtÞ:¼n last lines of ðsðtÞÞ1ðbðtÞ  rðtÞIdÞ. We assume that
Assumption 2.2. q is a process with positive components
Otherwise arbitrage opportunities can occur (see [18]).
bW ðtÞ:¼W ðtÞ þ Z t
0
YðsÞds; bMðtÞ:¼NðtÞ  Z t
0
qðsÞkðsÞds; t 2 ½0; T . (2.4)
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bðtÞX ðtÞ ¼ X ð0Þ þ
Z t
0
bðsÞpðsÞsðsÞdbSðsÞ. (2.5)
cP0:¼Y 0P where Y 0 ¼ E Z 
0
ðYðsÞdW ðsÞ þ ðqðsÞ  InÞ dMðsÞÞ
 
(2.6)
is the ‘‘risk neutral probability measure’’ for a non-insider.3. Modelization of three types of side-information
We consider the agent’s problem of maximizing his terminal wealth, in each of the
three settings of side-information. For sake of completeness, we recall here some
technical results of Hillairet [14].
3.1. Initial strong information
We suppose in this subsection that the agent knows a functional L o-wise from the
beginning. Let us make more precise the nature of this initial strong information:
Assumption 3.1. 8t 2 ½0; T , Ht ¼ sðLÞ where L is an A-measurable random
variable with values in a Polish space ðE;EÞ (meaning that the agent receives his
additional information immediately and only at time t ¼ 0) and moreover, L satisﬁes
the assumption: PðL 2 jFtÞðoÞPðL 2 Þ for all t 2 ½0; T ½ for P almost all o 2 O.
Remark. Assumption 3.1 is equivalent to: there exists a probability measure
equivalent to P and under which 8t 2 ½0; T ½, Ft and sðLÞ are independent. We
consider the only one that is identical to P onFT and we denote itQ
L. We introduce
the density process
ZðtÞ:¼EQL
dP
dQL




Gt , (3.1)
which satisﬁes dZðtÞ ¼ ZðtÞ½r1ðtÞdW ðtÞ þ ðr2ðtÞ  InÞ dMðtÞ, where r1 and r2 are
GT -predictable processes. eW ðÞ:¼W ðÞ  R 0 r1ðtÞdt is a ðGT ;PÞ-Brownian motion
and eMðÞ:¼NðÞ  R 0 k:r2ðtÞdt is the compensated process of a ðGT ;PÞ-Poisson
process with intensity ðk:r2Þ. Therefore the wealth (2.3) is meaningful under
Assumption 3.1.
Deﬁnition 3.2.
Y :¼E
Z 
0
ðYþ r1ðsÞÞ d eW ðsÞ þ qr2ðsÞ  In
 
d eMðsÞ  .
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dðY1ÞðtÞ ¼ Y1ðtÞlðtÞdbSðtÞ with l:¼ ðYþ r1Þ; r2q  In
  
.
Theorem 3.3. We assume 3.1 and that Y defined in (3.2) is a ðGT ;PÞ-martingale. ThenbP:¼YP is a ‘‘risk neutral probability measure’’ for the insider. bW and bM (definition
(2.4)) are, respectively, a ðGT ; bPÞ-Brownian motion and the compensated process of a
ðGT ; bPÞ-Poisson process with intensity ðq:kÞ. Furthermore, the market is complete for
the insider: if bA is a ðGT ; bPÞ-local martingale, there exists c 2 L1locðbS;GT ; bPÞ such that
8ðt;oÞ 2 ½0; T  
 O, bAðtÞ ¼ bAð0Þ þ R t
0
cðsÞdbSðsÞ.
3.2. Progressive strong information
In this subsection, we consider an agent whose additional information changes
through time. His knowledge is perturbed by an independent noise, and is getting to
him clearer as time evolves.
Assumption 3.4. 8t 2 ½0; T ; Ht ¼ sðLðsÞ; sptÞ where LðsÞ ¼LðJ;BðsÞÞ with L : R2 ! R is a given measurable function.
 B ¼ fBðtÞ; 0ptpTg is independent of FT .
 J is aFT -measurable random variable such that: PðJ 2 jFtÞðoÞ5PðJ 2 Þ for
all t 2 ½0; T ½ for P almost all o 2 O.
GT denote the usual enlarged ﬁltration ðGt ¼ \u4tðFu _ sðLðsÞ; spuÞÞÞt2½0;T ½. J
contains the additional information available to the insider, and B represents an
additional noise that perturbs this side-information. Therefore, one expects in
general that BðTÞ ¼ 0 and that the variance of the noise decreases to zero as revelation
time T approaches. We denote by Ptðo;dxÞ a regular version of the conditional law of
J given Ft and by PJ the law of J. According to Jacod [17] and Proposition 12 of
Grorud [11], there exists a measurable version of the conditional density pðt; xÞðoÞ ¼
dPt
dPJ
ðo; xÞ which is a ðFT ;PÞ-martingale and can be written, 8x 2 R, as
pðt; xÞ ¼ pð0; xÞ þ
Z t
0
aðs; xÞdW ðsÞ þ
Z t
0
bðs; xÞdMðsÞ,
where for all x, s ! aðs; xÞ and s ! bðs; xÞ are FT -predictable processes. Moreover,
for all soT , pðs;JÞ40 P almost surely.
Theorem 3.5. We assume that 8t 2 ½0; T ½, EP k aðt;JÞpðt;JÞ k þ kIn þ bðt;JÞpðt;JÞ k
 
oþ1 and
that In þ bðt;JÞpðt;JÞ
 
has positive components. Setting r1ðtÞ ¼ EP aðt;JÞpðt;JÞ j Gt
 
and
r2ðtÞ ¼ EP In þ bðt;JÞpðt;JÞ
 
j Gt
 
, we assume that
R T
0 ðkr1ðtÞk þ kðk:r2ÞðtÞkÞdtoþ
1 P almost surely. Then eW ðÞ:¼W ðÞ  R 0 r1ðsÞds is a ðGT ;PÞ-Brownian motion
and eMðÞ:¼NðÞ  R 0ðk:r2ÞðsÞds is the compensated process of a ðGT ;PÞ-Poisson
process with intensity ðk:r2Þ.
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risk neutral probability measure for this progressive strong informed agent.
Deﬁnition 3.6.
l:¼ ðYþ r1Þ;
r2
q
 In
  
,
Y :¼E
Z 
0
ðYþ r1ÞðsÞd eW ðsÞ þ qðsÞr2ðsÞ  In
 
d eMðsÞ  .
Y is a ðGT ;PÞ-local martingale and dðY1ÞðtÞ ¼ Y1ðtÞlðtÞdbSðtÞ.
Theorem 3.7. We assume 3.4 and the assumptions of Theorem 3.5. We assume
that Y defined in (3.6) is a ðGT ;PÞ-martingale. Then bP:¼Y ðTÞP is a risk neutral
probability measure for the agent. bW is a ðGT ; bPÞ-Brownian motion and bM is the
compensated process of a ðGT ; bPÞ-Poisson process with intensity ðq:kÞ.
3.3. Weak information
Here we consider that the true model of the stock prices is partially observed. More
precisely, the effective probability measure P of the market is unknown, but the
agents know the risk neutral probability measure cP0 of a non-insider (cf. Eq. (2.6)).
The discounted prices are ðFT ;cP0Þ-local martingales. The insider knows there will
be a release of information about the outcome of some variables L of the prices,
but in contrary to a strong information, he does not observe it, therefore he
anticipates its law. This agent is weakly informed on this FT -measurable random
variable L, meaning that he only has the ﬁltration FT available (thus his strategy is
FT -admissible), but he anticipates the law of L under P. Let L : O!Rj be a FT -
measurable random variable. As for a initial strong information, we assume that
Assumption 3.8. cP0ðL 2 jFtÞðoÞcP0ðL 2 Þ for all t 2 ½0; T ½ for P almost all o 2 O.
For example, L ¼ bW 1ðTÞ, L ¼ I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ or L ¼ lnðPi1ðTÞÞ  lnðPi2 ðTÞÞ satisfy
Assumption 3.8. With L we associate a probability measure n on Rj which admits an
almost surely positive bounded density x with respect to the law of L under cP0. The
insider knows that the law of L under the effective probability measure P is n. n is
called a weak information on the functional L.
Proposition 3.9 (Baudoin [6, Proposition 3]). On FT , there exists a unique
probability measure Pn such that(i) For any FT -measurable bounded random variable X, EPn ðX jLÞ ¼ E bP0ðX jLÞ.n(ii) The law of L under P is n.
Pn is called the minimal probability associated with the conditioning ðT ; L; nÞ.We deﬁne z the density process of Pn with respect to cP0
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zðtÞ:¼ dP
n
dcP0
 !
jFt
,
Y :¼ 1
z
.
Since z ¼ 1
Y
is a positive ðFT ;cP0Þ-local martingale, there exists a FT -predictable
process l such that d1
Y
ðtÞ ¼ 1
Y
ðtÞlðtÞdbSðtÞ.
3.4. The optimization problem
Let AoT . A progressive or initial strong insider wants to maximize the mapping
ðp; X Þ ! V ðp; X Þ:¼EP½lnðX ðAÞÞ j G0
over all GT -admissible strategies, whereas a weak insider wants to maximize
ðp; X Þ ! V ðp; X Þ:¼EPn ½lnðX ðAÞÞ
over all FT -admissible strategies.
We assume that the initial wealth is positive: X ð0Þ40 P almost surely. Then, for
those three types of insiders, the optimal wealth and portfolio are given by
8t 2 ½0; A;
bðtÞ bX ðtÞ ¼ X ð0Þ 1
Y
ðtÞ;
bpðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 Y ðtÞ
Y ðtÞ
bX ðtÞlðtÞ
8><>: (3.2)
with the corresponding processes 1
Y
and l. We remark here that the optimal wealth is
proportional to the process 1
Y
. Moreover, this process ‘‘summarizes’’ the information
available for the agent. Therefore, the key of the following computations will be the
computation of the process Y.Remark. If the insider maximizes the expectation of the logarithm of both his
consumption and his terminal wealth, the optimal strategy is given by a very similar
formula
8t 2 ½0; A;
bðtÞbcðtÞ ¼ X ð0Þ
A þ 1
1
Y
ðtÞ;
bðtÞ bX ðtÞ ¼ X ð0ÞðA þ 1 tÞ
A þ 1
1
Y
ðtÞ;
bpðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 Y ðtÞ
Y ðtÞ
bX ðtÞlðtÞ:
8>>>><>>>>>:
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of side-information
First we give some technical results to compute the process 1
Y
of an initial strong
insider. Then, for two examples of initial strong side-information that can occur in a
case of a merger between two companies, we compute the optimal strategy (wealth
and part of the wealth invested in each asset) and we compare it to the optimal
strategy of a non-insider.
4.1. Technical results for an initial strong insider
We recall here a result of Jeulin [19] (cf. [12, Lemma 3.1]).
Lemma 4.1. We assume there exists A 20; T ½ and a FA  E-measurable function
pðA; Þ such that, for all bounded E-measurable function f,
EP½f ðLÞjFA ¼
Z
E
f ðxÞpðA;o; xÞPLðdxÞ (4.1)
with pðA;o; xÞ40 P PL a.s., where PL is the law of L. Then the probability measure
QL:¼ 1
pðA;LÞ P is equivalent to P, Q
L ¼ P on FA and FA and sðLÞ are independent
under QL.
Remark 4.2. If the assumptions of Lemma 4.1 are satisﬁed for a function pðA; Þ,
then 8toA, pðt; Þ deﬁned by pðt; Þ:¼E
QL
½pðA; ÞjGt satisﬁes, for all bounded
E-measurable function f,
EP½f ðLÞjFt ¼
Z
E
f ðxÞpðt;o; xÞPLðdxÞ (4.2)
meaning that, 8tpA, the measure pðt; xÞP½L 2 dx on ðE;EÞ is a version of the
conditional distributions P½L 2 dxjFt.
Proof. First, we prove that if Y 2 L1ðO;FA;QLÞ, then for all tpA, EQL ½Y jGt ¼
EP½Y jFt. Indeed, let B 2Ft and g 2 L1ðE;PLÞ. Because of the independence of
sðLÞ and FA under QL and the fact that QL ¼ P on FA, we have
E
QL
½YgðLÞIB ¼ EQL ½YIBEQL ½gðLÞ
¼ EQL ½EP½Y IBjFtEQL ½gðLÞ
¼ E
QL
½EP½Y jFtIBgðLÞ.
Then we obtain (4.2) by taking E
QL
½jGt of the two members of relation (4.1) and
by using this result with Y ¼ EP½f ðLÞjFA. &
Therefore, the process Z introduced in (3.1), satisﬁes 8t 2 ½0; A ZðtÞ ¼ pðt; LÞ. We
recall that Y 0 (cf. (2.6)) denotes the process Y of a non-insider (for who r01 ¼ 0Rm
and r02 ¼ In).
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Proof. We recall that ZðtÞ ¼ EQL ½ dPdQL jGt and that
dZðtÞ ¼ ZðtÞ½r1ðtÞdW ðtÞ þ ðr2ðtÞ  InÞ dMðtÞ.
Therefore
1
Z
¼ E
Z 
0
r1ðsÞd eW ðsÞ þ 1r2ðsÞ  In
 
d eMðsÞ  .
Furthermore
Y 0 ¼ E
Z 
0
ðYðsÞdW ðsÞ þ ðqðsÞ  InÞ dMðsÞÞ
 
.
Since EðX ÞEðY Þ ¼ EðX þ Y  ½X ; Y Þ and with the Deﬁnition 3.2 of Y, we obtain
Y 0
Z
¼ E
Z 
0
ðYþ r1ÞðsÞd eW ðsÞ þ qr2 ðsÞ  In
 
d eMðsÞ   ¼ Y : &
The two following Examples 4.2 and 4.3 are initial strong side-information. We
imagine a case of a merger between two companies. The acquirer can buy the target
in cash or in shares at the time T. If he does it in cash, the acquirer bids for a given
price Pbid for each share of the target, at the maturity T. Therefore an insider will
know that the spot of the target at time T will be in a range around Pbid: this
situation corresponds to the information 4.2. If the acquisition is done with shares,
the acquirer will exchange Nt shares of the target for Na shares of the acquirer.
Therefore an insider will know that at the acquisition time T, the ratio of the assets
prices of the target and the acquirer will be equal to Nt
Na
: this time the situation
corresponds to the information 4.3.
We denote siW (respectively, siN ) the m ﬁrst (respectively, the n last) components
of si the ith line of s : si ¼ ðsiW ; siN Þ. For sake of simplicity, we assume k constant.
4.2. There exists i, 1pipd, such that L ¼ I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ, 0oaob
The insider knows whether the terminal price of the ith asset will be or not
between a and b. We introduce St:¼
R T
t
ksiW ðsÞk2 ds,
kxðtÞ:¼ ln x  lnðPið0ÞÞ 
Z T
0
biðsÞ 
1
2
ksiW ðsÞk2
 
ds

Z t
0
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ þ lnð1þ siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞ
 
, ð4:3Þ
ðF t;T ;kj Þn:¼ ðtjlj Þ 1pjpn
1pljpkj
2 Rk1þþkn j81pjpn; tptjl1p   ptjlkjpT
 
ð4:4Þ
ARTICLE IN PRESS
C. Hillairet / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 115 (2005) 1603–1627 1613and for ðtjlj Þ 1pjpn
1pljpkj
2 ðF t;T ;kj Þn,
f ðtjlj Þ
ðxÞ:¼ exp
 x Pnj¼1Pkjlj¼1 lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞ 2
2St
0B@
1CA. (4.5)
Let us introduce the scalar aðtÞ for t 2 ½0; A
aðtÞ:¼
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f ðtjlj Þ
ðkaðtÞÞ  f ðtjlj ÞðkbðtÞÞ
 Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj IðL¼1Þ
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kj ðTtÞ x
2
2Stﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
I
ðkaðtÞpxþ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
lnð1þsij ðtjlj ÞÞpkbðtÞÞ
dx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj
þ
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f ðtjlj Þ
ðkbðtÞÞ  f ðtjlj ÞðkaðtÞÞ
 Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj IðL¼0Þ
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kj ðTtÞ
x2
2Stﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p k
kj
j
R
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n I½kaðtÞ;kbðtÞC ðx þ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1 lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞÞdx
Qkj
lj¼1 dtjlj
.
Proposition 4.4. If the insider knows L ¼ I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ for some i (0oaob and 1pipd),
then ZðtÞ ¼ pðt; LÞ ¼ pðt; 1ÞIðL¼1Þ þ pðt; 0ÞIðL¼0Þ with
pðt; 1Þ
¼
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kj ðTtÞ
x2
2Stﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p k
kj
j
R
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n I
kaðtÞpxþ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
lnð1þsij ðtjlj ÞÞpkbðtÞ
 dxQkjlj¼1 dtjlj
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kj T
x2
2S0ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
p kkjj
R
ðF0;T ;kj Þ
n I
kað0Þpxþ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
lnð1þsij ðtjlj ÞÞpkbð0Þ
 dxQkjlj¼1dtjlj
,
pðt; 0Þ
¼
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kj ðTtÞ x
2
2Stﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
I½kaðtÞ;kbðtÞC ðx þ
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞÞdx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kjT x
2
2S0ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
p kkjj
Z
ðF0;T ;kj Þ
n
I½kað0Þ;kbð0ÞC ðx þ
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞÞdx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj
,
r1ðtÞ ¼ aðtÞsiW ðtÞ and r2ðtÞ  In ¼ aðtÞ lnð1þ siNðtÞÞ.
Proof. cf. Appendix A.4.
Remark. For a purely diffusive market model, the formulas are more simple:
pðt; 1Þ ¼ F ðt; kbðtÞÞ  F ðt; kaðtÞÞ
F ð0; kbð0ÞÞ  F ð0; kað0ÞÞ
; pðt; 0Þ ¼ 1 F ðt; kbðtÞÞ þ F ðt; kaðtÞÞ
1 F ð0; kbð0ÞÞ þ F ð0; kað0ÞÞ
,
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@F
@x
ðt; kbðtÞÞ 
@F
@x
ðt; kaðtÞÞ
1 F ðt; kbðtÞÞ þ F ðt; kaðtÞÞ
IðL¼0Þ 
@F
@x
ðt; kbðtÞÞ 
@F
@x
ðt; kaðtÞÞ
F ðt; kbðtÞÞ  F ðt; kaðtÞÞ
IðL¼1Þ,
where F ðt; Þ is the cumulative distribution function of a Gaussian Nð0;StÞ with
mean 0 and variance St ¼
R T
t
ksiðsÞk2 ds.
We will compare the insider’s strategy to the optimal strategy of a non-insider.Proposition 4.5. If the insider knows L ¼ I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ for some i (0oaob and 1pipd),
then if t is not a time of jump
bpbX ðtÞ  bp0cX 0 ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 siW ðtÞ; lnð1þ siN ðtÞÞq
 
aðtÞ.
In a purely diffusive market model, the part of the wealth invested in the assets j (1pjpd
and jai) are the same for this insider and a non-insider.
Proof. Let t be not a time of jump. Then yields bpbX ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1lðtÞ. Therefore the
difference between the part of the wealth invested in the four assets by an insider and
a non-insider is
bpbX ðtÞ  bp0cX 0 ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1ðlðtÞ  l0ðtÞÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 ðr1Þ; r2  I2q
  
ðtÞ
¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 siW ðtÞ;
lnð1þ siN ðtÞÞ
q
 
aðtÞ,
where aðtÞ is a scalar. In a purely diffusive market model,
bpbX ðtÞ  bp0cX 0 ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1si ðtÞaðtÞ ¼ ð0; . . . ; 0; aðtÞ
z}|{component i
; 0; . . . ; 0Þ
because ðsðtÞÞ1s1ðtÞ is the ith row of ðsðtÞÞ1sðtÞ ¼ ððsðtÞsðtÞÞ1Þ which is the
identity d 
 d-matrix. Therefore, in a purely diffusive market model, the part of the
wealth invested in the assets j (1pjpd and jai) are the same for an insider and a
non-insider. But this is not true in a mixed diffusive-jump market model (cf. Figs. 3
and 4, for a simulation in a diffusive-jump market model with four risky assets)
because ðsðtÞÞ1ðsiW ðtÞ; lnð1þsiN ðtÞÞq Það0; . . . ; 0; 1
z}|{component i
; 0; . . . ; 0Þ. From a
mathematical point of view, this difference comes from the expression of the
logarithm of the prices, because the ln function appears in the jump part. From an
heuristic point of view, it seems that the insider uses his side-information to learn
about the jump process and reﬂect it in all the assets. &
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The insider knows the ratio of assets i1 and i2 prices at time T. We introduce
mt:¼
Z T
0
ðbi1  bi2Þ 
1
2
ðksi1Wk2  ksi2Wk2Þ
 
ðsÞds
þ
Z t
0
ðsi1W  si2W ÞðsÞdW ðsÞ þ
Z t
0
ln
1þ si1N
1þ si2N
 
ðsÞdNðsÞ.
Then we have
L ¼ mt þ
Z T
t
ðsi1W  si2W ÞðsÞdW ðsÞ þ
Z T
t
ln
1þ si1N
1þ si2N
 
ðsÞdNðsÞ.
ðFt;T ;kj Þn and f ðtjlj Þ are deﬁned in (4.4) and (4.5).
In this subsection, St:¼
R T
t
ksi1W  si2Wk2ðsÞds and
aðtÞ
:¼
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
1
St
k
kj
j
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f ðtjlj Þ
ðL  mtÞ L  mt 
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
ln
1þ si1j
1þ si2j
 
ðtjlj Þ
 Ykj
lj¼1
dtjljQn
j¼1
P
kjX0
k
kj
j
R
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n f ðtjlj Þ
ðL  mtÞ
Qkj
lj¼1dtjlj
.
Using similar methods as for 4.2, we obtain
Proposition 4.6. If the insider knows L ¼ lnðPi1ðTÞÞ  lnðPi2 ðTÞÞ, then ZðtÞ ¼ pðt; LÞ
with
pðt; xÞ ¼
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
e
ð
 xmt
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
ln
1þsi1 j
1þsi2 j
 
ðtjlj Þ
 2
2St
ÞYkj
lj¼1
dtjlj
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekjTﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
p kkjj
Z
ðF0;T ;kj Þ
n
e
ð
 xm0
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
ln
1þsi1 j
1þsi2 j
 
ðtjlj Þ
 2
2S0
ÞYkj
lj¼1
dtjlj
.
r1ðtÞ ¼ aðtÞðsi1W  si2W ÞðtÞ and r2ðtÞ  In ¼ aðtÞ ln
1þ si1N ðtÞ
1þ si2N ðtÞ
 
.
Remark. For a purely diffusive market model, the formulas are more simple
ZðtÞ ¼ pðt; LÞ
¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p exp ð
R T
t
ðsi1  si2 ÞðsÞdW ðsÞÞ2
2St
þ ð
R T
0 ðsi1  si2ÞðsÞdW ðsÞÞ2
2S0
 !
,
aðtÞ ¼
R T
t
ðsi1  si2 ÞðsÞdW ðsÞ
St
where St:¼
Z T
t
ksi1  si2k2ðsÞds: &
The following proposition compare this insider’s strategy to the optimal strategy
of a non-insider.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
C. Hillairet / Stochastic Processes and their Applications 115 (2005) 1603–16271616Proposition 4.7. If the insider knows L ¼ lnðPi1 ðTÞÞ  lnðPi2ðTÞÞ, then if t is not a
time of jumpbpbX ðtÞ  bp0cX 0 ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 ðsi1W  si2W ÞðtÞ; 1q ln 1þ si1N1þ si2N
 
ðtÞ
 
aðtÞ.
In a purely diffusive market model, the part of the wealth invested in the bond and the
assets j (1pjpd, jai1 and jai2) are the same for this insider and a non-insider.
Proof. Let t be not a time of jump. Then the difference between the part of the
wealth invested in the four assets by an insider and a non-insider isbpbX ðtÞ  bp0cX 0 ðtÞ ¼ ðsðtÞÞ1 ðsi1W  si2W ÞðtÞ; 1q ln 1þ si1N1þ si2N
 
ðtÞ
 
aðtÞ,
where aðtÞ is a scalar. In a purely diffusive market model,
ðsðtÞÞ1ðsi1W  si2W ÞðtÞ
¼ ð0; . . . ; 0; 1
z}|{component i1
; 0; . . . ; 0; 1
z}|{component i2
; 0; . . . ; 0Þ.
Since the fraction of the wealth invested in the bond is equal to 1Pdi¼1bpibX , the part
of the wealth invested in the bond and the assets j (1pjpd, jai1 and jai2) are
the same for an insider and a non-insider. But this is not true in a mixed diffusive-
jump market model (cf. Figs. 6 and 9 for a simulation in a diffusive-jump market
model with four risky assets). &5. Simulations
We simulate the strategy of an insider optimizing his terminal wealth on ½0; A
(AoT). Here are the data we have used for our simulations. A ¼ 0:95 and T ¼ 1 and
the initial wealth is equal to 1: X ð0Þ ¼ 1. Both Brownian motion and Poisson process
are 2-dimensional: m ¼ n ¼ 2. The intensity of the Poisson process is k ¼ ð3; 2Þ. We
choose constant market coefﬁcients, but the simulations could be easily extended with
time-varying market coefﬁcients. The annual interest rate is 0.02: rðtÞ ¼ 0:02 for all t.
The drift bðtÞ ¼
0:15
0:1
0:084
0:1
0BBB@
1CCCA 8t 2 ½0; T .
The volatility sðtÞ ¼
0:4 0:1 0:15 0:17
0:09 0:4 0:03 0:035
0:048 0:12 0:1 0:12
0:075 0:26 0:31 0:28
0BBB@
1CCCA 8t 2 ½0; T .
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the components of the volatility on the diffusion part (in the practice the standard
variation of a purely diffusive asset is in the range [0.1,0.4]). The last two rows of s
are the components of the volatility on the jump part. We choose s3i and s4i
(i ¼ 1; . . . ; 4) in the same range and of opposite sign so that the price of asset i does
not increase (or decrease) at each jump time. The prices of the assets at time t ¼ 0 are
1 : Pið0Þ ¼ 1, i ¼ 0; . . . ; 4.
We simulate the optimal strategy (wealth and part of the wealth invested in each
asset) of a non-insider and an insider. In 5.1 (respectively, in 5.2), the insider has the
side-information of Example 4.2 (respectively, of Example 4.3). Our aim is to
determine qualitatively the optimal strategy and to show that the simulated optimal
investments are in agreement with what we could have expected. Finally, we
compare in 5.3 the processes 1
Y
for one example of each type of side-information.
Here, we want to show that for the same noise dynamics, the wealths are plausibly
ordered in the sense of increasing relevance of side-information.
5.1. L ¼ I½a;bðP1ðTÞÞ, 0oaob
cf. Appendix A.1, p. 18 for the ﬁgures. In our simulation,
EPðP1ðTÞÞ ¼ P1ð0Þ expðTðb1  12ks1Wk2ÞÞð1þ s13Þk1T ð1þ s14Þk2T ¼ 0:8971.
We notice on Fig. 1 that 1
Y
is bigger than 1
Y0
, therefore the wealth of the insider is
larger than those of a non-insider. If P1ðTÞ is in ½a; b, the more ½a; b is away from its
expectation EPðP1ðTÞÞ, the better the gain is. We can explain this by the fact that in
this case, the insider knows an event that occurs with a low probability, therefore his
side-information is important. Thus, the more relevant a side-information is, the
bigger the process 1
Y
(and therefore the optimal wealth) is. We notice also that the
bigger P1ðTÞ is, the bigger 1Y and 1Y0 are.
Furthermore, as noticed in Proposition 4.5, the parts of the wealth invested in each
asset by an insider and a non-insider are different (cf. Figs. 2–4). If t is not a time of
jump, the fact that the market coefﬁcients r, b and s are constant implies that bp0bX0 of a
non-insider is constant, and that the parts of wealth invested by the insider in the
bond and each of the four risky assets are proportional to each other.
We notice that the insider’s strategy in our simulations is very rational and is as we
can expect: the strategy depends on the value of L and if EPðP1ðTÞÞ is in ½a; b or not. Case 1: P1ðTÞe½a; b and EPðP1ðTÞÞe½a; b: The side-information is not very
relevant. The insider’s strategy is the following.
If aoboEPðP1ðTÞÞ, then P½P1ðTÞ4EPðP1ðTÞÞ4P½P1ðTÞoEPðP1ðTÞÞ. Thus the
insider (compared to a non-insider) invests more in the ﬁrst asset and less in the
bond, regardless of the ﬁrst asset price. Conversely if EPðP1ðTÞÞoaob, the insider
invests less in the ﬁrst asset and more in the bond. Case 2: P1ðTÞe½a; b and EPðP1ðTÞÞ 2 ½a; b: The insider follows the ﬁrst asset
price. At time t, if P1ðtÞoEPðP1ðTÞÞ the insider thinks that P1ðTÞoa and invests
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insider invests more in the ﬁrst asset and less in the bond. Case 3: P1ðTÞ 2 ½a; b and EPðP1ðTÞÞe½a; b: The side-information is very relevant,
the insider knows exactly if P1ðTÞ is bigger or not than its expectation. His gain is
important. If P1ðTÞ4EPðP1ðTÞÞ, he invests more in the ﬁrst asset. Conversely if
P1ðTÞoEPðP1ðTÞÞ, he invests less in the ﬁrst asset. Case 4: P1ðTÞ 2 ½a; b and EPðP1ðTÞÞ 2 ½a; b: The insider follows the ﬁrst asset
price. At time t, he invests more in the ﬁrst asset if P1ðtÞ is near the bottom range a
(because he knows that P1ðTÞ4a and thus P1 will increase) and if P1ðtÞ is near the
top range b he invests less in the ﬁrst asset.
5.2. L ¼ lnðP1ðTÞÞ  lnðP2ðTÞÞ
cf. Appendix A.2, p. 21 for the ﬁgures. In our simulation,
EPðlnðP1ðTÞÞ  lnðP2ðTÞÞÞ ¼ Tðb1  b2Þ 
T
2
ðks1Wk2Þ 
T
2
ks2Wk2
  
þ k1T ln
1þ s13
1þ s23
 
þ k2T ln
1þ s14
1þ s24
 
¼  0:1019.
We notice on Fig. 5 that 1
Y
is bigger than 1
Y0
. The insider strategy on assets 1 and 2
depends on the position of lnðP1ðtÞ
P2ðtÞÞ (the ratio of assets 1 and 2 at time t) compared to
the value of L (which is the same ratio at time T). If lnðP1
P2
ÞðtÞ4L (cf. Fig. 7 for the
graph of lnðP1
P2
Þ), the fraction of the wealth at time t invested in asset 1 (respectively,
in asset 2) is smaller (respectively, bigger) than those of a non-insider. Indeed the
insider knows that at maturity time T, the ratio lnðP1
P2
Þ will be smaller than it is
now, meaning that the price of asset 1 will decrease compared to the price of
asset 2. Inversely if lnðP1
P2
ÞðtÞoL, the insider invests more in asset 1 and less in asset 2
(cf. Fig. 8).
Furthermore, as noticed in Proposition 4.7, the parts of the wealth invested in each
asset by an insider and a non-insider are different (cf. Figs. 6–9).
5.3. Comparison between the three types of side-information
According to Eq. (3.2), the process Y is sufﬁcient to explicit the optimal strategy.
That is why we focus our attention on this process. We would like to compare the
processes Y for the three types of side-information of Section 3 and show that the
more relevant a side-information is, the bigger the process 1
Y
(and thus the optimal
wealth) is. To do that, we simulate simultaneously (i.e. for the same realization of o)
the process 1
Y
of four agents. First, we simulate the process 1
Y0
of a non-insider.
 The ﬁrst insider is an initial strong one. Since the beginning he knows the
functional L1 ¼ W 1ðTÞ. Since the law of L1 givenFt is a Gaussian law with mean
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pðt; xÞ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T  t
p exp  ðx  W 1ðtÞÞ
2
2ðT  tÞ þ
x2
2T
 
and
1
Y 1
¼ Z1
Y 0
with
Z1ðtÞ ¼ pðt; L1Þ ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T  tp exp 
ðW 1ðTÞ  W 1ðtÞÞ2
2ðT  tÞ þ
W 1ðTÞ2
2T
 
. The second insider is a progressive strong one, at time t (for all 0ptpT) he knows
the functional L2ðtÞ ¼ 2W 1ðTÞ þ BTt where B is a Brownian motion independent
of FT . Then r22 ¼ 0, r23 ¼ 1, r24 ¼ 1 and
r21ðtÞ ¼
2ð2ðW 1ðTÞ  W 1ðtÞÞ þ BðTtÞÞ
5ðT  tÞ
1
Y 2
ðtÞ ¼ 1
Y 0
ðtÞE
Z t
0
r21ðsÞdW 1ðsÞ
 
. The third insider is a weak insider, he anticipes that the law of L3 ¼ bW 1ðTÞ will
be a Gaussian law with mean m ¼ R T0 Pdj¼1ðsÞ11j ðsÞðbj  rÞðsÞds and variance T.
Then (cf. [5])
1
Y 3
ðtÞ ¼
Z
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pðT  tÞ
p exp y2
2T
 ðy 
bW 1ðtÞÞ2
2ðT  tÞ 
ðy  mÞ2
2T
 !
dy
that we simulate by mean of a Monte-Carlo method.
Results: We notice (cf. Fig. 10) that 1
Y0
p 1
Y3
p 1
Y2
p 1
Y1
: the more informed an agent
is, the bigger his process 1
Y
. 1
Y0
and 1
Y3
are very close together and the distance between
them stay quite constant as time evolves, whereas 1
Y2
and 1
Y1
get further away from 1
Y0
as time T approaches.Acknowledgements
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A.1. L ¼ I½a;bðP1ðTÞÞ
In this simulation, a ¼ 0:7, b ¼ 1:1, P1ðTÞ ¼ 1:5422. The ﬁrst Poisson process
jumps at time 0.7039 and 0.9695, the second at time 0.8280 and 0.9129. cf.
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Fig. 1. Processes 1
Y0
and 1
Y
: a ¼ 0:7, b ¼ 1:1, P1ðTÞ ¼ 1:5422.
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Fig. 2. Portfolio on the bond and portfolio on asset 1: a ¼ 0:7, b ¼ 1:1, P1ðTÞ ¼ 1:5422.
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Fig. 3. Portfolio on asset 2 and portfolio on asset 3: a ¼ 0:7, b ¼ 1:1, P1ðTÞ ¼ 1:5422.
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Fig. 4. Portfolio on asset 4: a ¼ 0:7, b ¼ 1:1, P1ðTÞ ¼ 1:5422.
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In this simulation, L ¼ 0:316. The ﬁrst Poisson process jumps at time 0.0227 and
0.466, the second at time 0.1875 and 0.718. cf. Figs. 5–9.
A.3. Comparison between the three types of side-information
In this simulation, the ﬁrst Poisson process jumps at time 0.0369, 0.0567, 0.4211,
0.6968 and 0.9477, the second at time 0.0111, 0.2338. cf. Fig. 10.
We recall that bðtÞ bX ðtÞ ¼ X ð0Þ 1
Y
ðtÞ.
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Fig. 5. Processes 1
Y0
and 1
Y
: L ¼ 0:316.
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Fig. 6. Portfolio on the bond: L ¼ 0:316.
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Fig. 7. lnðP1ðtÞÞ  lnðP2ðtÞÞ: L ¼ 0:316.
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Fig. 8. Portfolio on asset 1 and portfolio on asset 2: L ¼ 0:316.
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The insider knows whether the terminal price of the ith asset will be or not
between a and b: L ¼ I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ.
lnðPiðTÞÞ ¼ lnðPið0ÞÞ þ
Z T
0
biðsÞ 
1
2
ksiW ðsÞk2
 
ds þ
Z T
0
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ
þ
Z T
0
lnð1þ siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞ,
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Fig. 9. Portfolio on asset 3 and portfolio on asset 4: L ¼ 0:316.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the processes 1
Y
for four agents.
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¼ P kaðtÞp
Z T
t
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ þ lnð1þ siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞpkbðtÞ
 
because
R T
t
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ þ lnð1þ siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞ is independent of Ft and 8x 2 R, kx
(deﬁned in (4.3)) is Ft-measurable. What is the law of
R T
t
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ þ lnð1þ
siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞ? Since Nj is a Poisson process with intensity kj, if tji is the ith time of
jump of Nj, the random variables ðtjiþ1  tjiÞiX1 are independent; their law is
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I0pt1pptkk
k
j e
kj tk dt1    dtk with respect to the Lebesgue measure on Rk. Therefore,
let f be a bounded real measurable function and we introduce the sets
Dt;T ;k ¼ fðt1; . . . ; tpþkÞ 2 Rpþkj0pt1p   ptp1ptptp
p   ptpþk1pTptpþkg,
Ft;T ;k ¼ fðt1; . . . ; tkÞ 2 Rkj0ptpt1p   ptkpTg.
EP f
Z T
t
lnð1þ sijðsÞÞdNjðsÞ
  
¼
X
kX0
X
pX1
kpþkj
Z
Dt;T ;k
f
Xk1
l¼0
lnð1þ sijðtpþlÞÞ
 !
ekj tpþk dt1    dtpþk
¼
X
kX0
kkj
X
pX1
kpj
Z
0pt1pptp1pt
dt1   dtp1
 ! Z
Tptpþk
ekj tpþk dtpþk
 !


Z
tptppptpþk1pT
f
Xk1
l¼0
lnð1þ sijðtpþlÞÞ
 !
dtp    dtpþk1
 !
¼
X
kX0
ekj ðTtÞkkj
Z
Ft;T ;k
f
Xk
l¼1
lnð1þ sijðtlÞÞ
 !
dt1   dtk.
We use the convention that
R
Ft;T ;k
f ðx þPkl¼1 lnð1þ sijðtlÞÞÞdt1    dtk ¼ f ðxÞ if
k ¼ 0. The last equality follows from a change of index in the last bracket and
from the fact that
X
pX1
kpj
Z
0pt1pptp1pt
dt1    dtp1
 ! Z
Tptpþk
ekj tpþk dtpþk
 !
¼
X
pX1
ðkj tÞp1
ðp  1Þ! e
kjT ¼ ekj ðTtÞ.
Since the Poisson processes N1; . . . ; Nn are mutually independent,
EP f
Z T
t
lnð1þ siNðsÞÞdNðsÞ
  
¼
Yn
j¼1
X
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞk
kj
j
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞ
0@ 1AYkj
lj¼1
dtjlj
ðA:1Þ
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R T
t
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ is independent of ðN1; . . . ; NnÞ, its law
is a Gaussian law with mean 0 and variance St ¼
R T
t
ksiW ðsÞk2 ds, thus
EP f
Z T
t
siW ðsÞdW ðsÞ þ lnð1þ siN ðsÞÞdNðsÞ
  
¼
Z
R
Yn
j¼1
X
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞk
kj
j
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f x þ
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞ
0@ 1A


exp
x2
2St
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p dx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj .
Therefore
P½I½a;bðPiðTÞÞ ¼ 1jFt ¼
Z
R
Yn
j¼1
X
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞk
kj
j


Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
I
ðkaðtÞpxþ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
lnð1þsij ðtjlj ÞÞpkbðtÞÞ


exp
x2
2St
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p dx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj .
This yields the formulas of pðt; 1Þ and pðt; 0Þ given in Proposition 4.4.
The coefﬁcient of dpðt; 1Þ on dW ðtÞ is
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f ðtjlj Þ
ðkaðtÞÞ  f ðtjlj ÞðkbðtÞÞ
 Ykj
lj¼1
dtjljsiW ðtÞ
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kjT x
2
2S0ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
p kkjj
Z
ðF0;T ;kj Þ
n
I
kað0Þpxþ
Pn
j¼1
Pkj
lj¼1
lnð1þsij ðtjlj ÞÞpkbð0Þ
 dxYkj
lj¼1
dtjlj
with f ðtjlj Þ
deﬁned in (4.5). The coefﬁcient of dpðt; 0Þ on dW ðtÞ is
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
ekj ðTtÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pSt
p kkjj
Z
ðFt;T ;kj Þ
n
f ðtjlj Þ
ðkbðtÞÞ  f ðtjlj ÞðkaðtÞÞ
 Ykj
lj¼1
dtjljsiW ðtÞ
R
R
Qn
j¼1
P
kjX0
e
kjT x
2
2S0ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pS0
p kkjj
Z
ðF0;T ;kj Þ
n
I½kað0Þ;kbð0ÞC x þ
Xn
j¼1
Xkj
lj¼1
lnð1þ sijðtjlj ÞÞ
 
dx
Ykj
lj¼1
dtjlj
.
Thus we obtain the expression of rkðtÞ given in Proposition 4.4, with aðtÞ deﬁned in
p. 11. &
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